Evidence-based sentencing

The concept of evidence-based sentencing makes as much theoretical sense as any evidence-based practice. The rub comes when we consider the context - what is recognized by society as evidence and what is accepted by society in terms of application or implementation, as well as a host of broader environmental factors.

The first question that arises in my mind about evidence-based sentencing concerns the aim of reducing recidivism. How much improvement can evidence-based sentencing make to the primary correctional aspect of the correctional services? No doubt, there will be a reduction in recidivism, and not all of that reduction will be the consequence of longer prison sentences for likely repeat offenders. But is such a reduction sufficient in and of itself?

There is much to be done in respect to creating a system of correctional services by which even an innocent person wrongly convicted would still benefit from the experience. But any alleged improvements to the correctional services would be moot – and possibly even somewhat fraudulent – if the vast majority of crimes remain a direct or indirect consequence of the wealth gap.

In short, without eliminating the social disease of capitalism, evidence-based sentencing may not be ethically sound. It might prove to be no more than a high-sounding methodology for enabling the wealthy elite to more effectively suppress opposition to their exploitative opportunism.

Amazon versus Hachette... and Paul Verhaeghe

I just received a letter from Kindle Direct Publishing that, somewhat hypocritically, tries to garner support for Amazon in their dispute with Hachette.

While I find it absurd that the Kindle version of a book can be more expensive than the paperback version of the same book... as is the case with Paul Verhaeghe's What About Me?: The Struggle for Identity in a Market-Based Society... Amazon's letter on this subject is clearly self-serving and manipulative.

And perhaps it is also a bit absurd (and hypocritical?) for Paul Verhaeghe to decry a market-based society while actively participating in and profiting from that which he deplores.

Why not sonar?

It is an oft-stated maxim that great power incurs great responsibility. Parents should not get in the habit of beating their children but rather should strive patiently to educate them. We don't chop off a limb each time it gets scratched, and we don't lop off our heads just because we have a headache.

So I'm of the opinion that the Israeli Defense Force should be just that in relation to the Palestinians. It should focus on defense and shun offense. There simply is no justification for the number and percentage of civilian casualties that is being reported today. In war, it may be argued that the best defense is a good offense. But, nowadays, what war lasts for 50 years? And if a war does last that long, then someone should have long ago implemented a more effective solution than the military one.

Israel was and still is concerned about rockets fired from Palestinian territory. But now we see that the Iron Dome defense system has proved quite effective at minimizing that risk. Yes, definitely, the disruption to daily life from such rocket attacks is more than a small headache; but does it call for the deaths of more than 400 Palestinians of whom 70% are non-combatants, many of them women and children? I say No.

Israel is also concerned about tunnels being used for attacking communities on the border of Gaza. Given the circumstances, it is a legitimate concern. But what about sonar? Can it not function under land as well as water? Can sonar not detect underground caverns, construction, and movement? And are there no radar satellites that can detect underground construction? If the technology is not yet up to the standard required for countering the tunnels built by Hamas, then Israel and the world's well-wishers should rapidly bring it up to that standard.

Of course, neither sonar or radar is a long-term solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Nor is the so-called two-state solution. As Prabhat Ranjan Sarkar was wont to say, "The present age is not the age of large animals and small states." (Sarkar, Prabhat Ranjan (1984). "Socioeconomic Movements" published in A Few Problems Solved Part 9. Ananda Marga Publications.) The only long-term solution in the region is for Israelis and Palestinians to live side by side as fellow citizens of one and the same nation.

Flipping the switch on human consciousness?

These are my observations after reading a Washington Post article on this subject.

It is remarkable to me how many definitions or interpretations of the word, consciousness, exist. Personally, to avoid confusion, I prefer not to use that word in the context that we find in the referenced article.

An on-off switch in the brain for awareness? I don't think it is as simple as that. Imagine a desktop computer. It is largely useless without its peripheral devices. For the sake of this analogy, let us just consider the computer in association with a single input-output device, a touch-screen monitor. 

Try to turn on either the computer or the monitor without first plugging it into an electrical outlet, and nothing at all will happen in respect to the unpowered device. 

Power up the monitor without powering up the computer; and you won't see any information processed by the computer, and you won't be able to send any commands to the computer. 

Power up the computer without powering up the monitor; and again you won't see any information processed by the computer, and you won't be able to send any commands to the computer via the monitor (although in this case the computer is able to process data). 

Finally, even when you power up both the computer and the monitor, still the monitor won't report any data processed by the computer and you won't be able to send commands to the computer if the monitor is not connected to the computer. 

As to the anecdotal event reported in the article – a primitive experiment at best – it is interesting, but we should not be hasty in drawing general conclusions from it. We don't know whether the same procedure would have a similar impact on other persons. But, even if it were to have the same impact on others, there could be several explanations for that impact. To extend the earlier analogy, here are three possibilities:

(1) The electrical impulses at that point in the brain could be putting either the 'computer' or the 'monitor' or both into sleep mode.

(2) The electrical impulses at that point in the brain could be disconnecting the monitor from the computer (without putting either of them into sleep mode). 

(3) The electrical impulses at that point in the brain could be disconnecting the monitor from the computer and also putting one or both of them into sleep mode (directly or indirectly).

A Critique of Victor J. Stenger's "The New Atheism: Taking a Stand for Science and Reason"

This critique is in response to the book description found on amazon.com.

In recent years a number of bestselling books have forcefully argued that belief in God can no longer be defended on rational or empirical grounds, and that the scientific worldview has rendered obsolete the traditional beliefs held by Christianity, Judaism, and Islam. The authors of these books--Richard Dawkins, Daniel Dennett, Sam Harris, Christopher Hitchens, and Victor J. Stenger--have come to be known as the "New Atheists." Predictably, their works have been controversial and attracted a good deal of critical reaction.

I completely agree with the statement in regard to Christianity, Judaism, and Islam. However, this is not a refutation of belief in God. It merely refutes the (Western) Judaeo-Christian-Isalamic religious tradition. The fact that the authors of those books – all of them Westerners – deem this to be equivalent to a refutation of belief in God merely reflects their own cultural arrogance, their irrational sociosentiment.

In this new book, Victor J. Stenger, whose God: The Failed Hypothesis was on the New York Times bestseller list in 2007, reviews and expands upon the principles of New Atheism and answers many of its critics. He demonstrates in detail that naturalism--the view that all of reality is reducible to matter and nothing else--is sufficient to explain everything we observe in the universe, from the most distant galaxies to the inner workings of the brain that result in the phenomenon of mind.

This statement is patently false. We don't have an adequate materialist/naturalist explanation of subjective conscious experiences (qualia). And naturalist/materialist proponents have – like most Western thinkers – only addressed cosmological issues regarding efficient cause, never touching on the subject of material cause. The belief that material science can answer all unanswered questions regarding this universe is a type of faith that is essentially religious in nature. It is merely belief, not science but scientism.

Stenger disputes the claim of many critics that the question of whether God exists is beyond the ken of science. On the contrary, he argues that absence of evidence for God is, indeed, evidence of absence when the evidence should be there and is not.

That dog won't hunt when spiritual people – and even religious people – deem there to be evidence of God's existence all around them. Stenger expresses his own materialist point of view and treats that as if it is the only point of view. In other words, Stenger looks at the universe and sees no evidence of God, whereas the spiritualist looks at the universe and sees everything as evidence of God.

Turning from scientific to historical evidence, Stenger then points out the many examples of evil perpetrated in the name of religion.

In his book, Stenger also acknowledges many examples of evil perpetrated in the name of materialistic notions – German Nazism, Russian Communism, Cambodian Communism, and so on. But then he tries to pooh-pooh it away. "As we saw in chapter 5, believers try to argue that atheism is more evil than theism because twentieth-century atheists such as Hitler, Stalin, and Pol Pot killed more people than the Crusaders, the Inquisitors, and the kings of Christendom put together. I showed that this statement is disputable since Hitler was not an atheist and the numbers themselves are arguable." (Section on "Religion and Morality" in Chapter 6 "Religion and Morality")

How does the fact that Hitler might not have been an atheist negate the atrocities of Stalin and Pol Pot? And, hold on a minute... "The numbers themselves are arguable"? And why would anyone want to replace one bad thing with another bad thing? Why not replace the bad thing with something good?

Stenger argues: "Hitler killed six million Jews for at least partially religious reasons. They killed God. In any case, if there had been no religion there would not have been a group so separated from the rest of society that they stood out as different." (Section on "Lessons from Mormonism" in Chapter 5 "Holy Smoke") Once again, hold on a minute... "They killed God"? Who is talking here: Hitler or Stenger? And, just out of curiosity, how does one kill an entity that is posited to be all-powerful and eternal? Furthermore, was Hitler's reason for killing Jews religious, economic, or racial? (Personally, I find it hard to believe anything said by politicians, political people.) But leaving aside these somewhat minor issues, here we find Stenger effectively blaming the victim for the crime. "If there were no Jews, there would have been no Holocaust. If women were not weaker than men, and if they did not look different from men... and if they did not expose themselves by going out on the streets... they would not get raped."

He also notes that the Bible, which is still taken to be divine revelation by millions, fails as a basis for morality and is unable to account for the problem of unnecessary suffering throughout the world.

Certainly I agree that the Bible fails as a basis for morality. But the system of Yama-Niyama found in Tantra/Yoga is far superior to anything contrived by materialists/naturalists.

I find it interesting but not surprising that Stenger never once mentions the ethical code of Yama-Niyama. He talks about the moral codes of Buddhism and Jainism, both of which were based on Yama-Niyama (with focus on the first point of Yama, Ahimsa). But Stenger never even mentions the word Ahimsa either. Instead, he absurdly attempts to fit a square peg into a round hole by asserting that there is a "universal morality" that is somehow embodied in the "Golden Rule" (or a more stringent form of it). Stenger then dogmatically asserts that the Ahimsa of Buddhism and also Jainism is somehow a mere extension of the Golden Rule. This type of preposterous straw-man analysis might fool someone with little or no knowledge of Eastern religion and its ethical roots, but such shoddy intellectualism is not worth a farthing to a serious seeker of truth.

According to Stenger: "The entire philosophy of Jainism... is based on avoiding the suffering of any living thing, a true altruism much more demanding than the Golden Rule." (Section on "Universal Morality" in Chapter 6 "Suffering and Morality") This is utter nonsense. While it is true that Jains take the concept of not hurting other living creatures to be their primary religious duty – a duty that they extend to an extreme and untenable extent, to the point of feeding termites in their own house while employing military force to repel human invaders – it is utterly idiotic to claim that this is "true altruism" and that "the entire philosophy of Jainism is based" on that.

Finally, he discusses the teachings of ancient nontheist sages such as Buddha, Lao Tzu, and Confucius, whose guidelines for coping with the problems of life and death did not depend upon a supernatural metaphysics.

It is rather interesting that when considering existential and ethical issues, the ancient nontheist sages that Stenger considers are mostly Eastern. But let's look a bit closer at the three persons mentioned here, because it is not a given that all of these three philosophers were "nontheist".

Buddha might well have been theistic. The fact that he did not reply to a question asked on this subject is not proof that he did not believe in God. It could simply have been Buddha's way of pointing out that God is ineffable. In any event, Buddha's concept of Ahimsa was taken from the theistic Tantric tradition.

As to Lao Tzu, like Buddha, whether he was theistic or nontheistic is not clear. However, it is clear that he was not materialistic or 'naturalistic'. "The Tao that can be told of is not the Absolute Tao; the Names that can be given are not Absolute Names. The Nameless is the origin of Heaven and Earth; the Named is the Mother of All Things... He who knows does not speak; he who speaks does not know." (From Chapter 1 and 56 of the Tao Te Ching by Lao Tzu) Furthermore, Lao Tzu's path of Taoism may be viewed as a Chinese derivative of Tantra. According to Shrii Shrii Anandamurti, over time the Sanskrit word tantra underwent various metamorphoses in China: tantra became taota; taota became taoa; and, in modern Chinese, taoa became tao. (Chapter on "Acoustic Roots" in "Ananda Vacanamrtam Part 14")

Regarding Confucius, he might indeed have developed a secular ethical code. But, in my opinion, that secular ethical code is not significantly better than the ethics found in the Bible, because it tends to entrench the status quo and serve the interest of imperialists.

Stenger argues that this "way of nature" is far superior to the traditional supernatural monotheisms, which history shows can lead to a host of evils.

Once again I would point out that what is referred to here as "traditional supernatural monotheism" is merely the Western religious tradition (which, in fact, is not at all the same as the much older tradition of Tantric monotheism). And, while Western theism has led to a host of evils (as demonstrated by history), undoubtedly Western atheism has also led to a host of evils (as also demonstrated by history). So, instead of replacing Western monotheism with Western atheism or Western materialism or Western naturalism, it makes more sense to look in a different direction – a direction that is non-Western or not exclusively Western.

The New Atheism is a well-argued defense of the atheist position and a strong rebuttal of its critics.

How strong a rebuttal it is would be best demonstrated in the setting of a debate, not a monologue. Personally, I find Stenger's arguments to be weak and sometimes quite objectionable.

"The Brain And The Meaning Of Life" by Paul Thagard

Recently, while discussing the meaning of life, a self-described naturalist brought up a 2012 book by another naturalist, Paul Thagard. In that book, Thagard allegedly argued that "reality is what science can discover". That argument struck me as highly absurd. It is the essence of scientism, a religion that effectively worships science by attributing divine qualities to it and by treating scientists (and inevitably pseudoscientists) as priests. What makes scientism somewhat less refined philosophically than most religions is the fact that we all know how fallible science is, but in most cases the fallibility of God is much harder if not impossible to establish. Those who worship a transcendent God may not be able to prove the existence of their God, but neither can anyone prove the non-existence of their God. But if the God who is worshiped is not transcendent - for example, if it is a deity with physical attributes allegedly living on the top of a mountain or if it is a system of knowledge with frequently shifting content - then it is rather easy to discredit such a deity.

Given the absurdity of the notion that reality could or necessarily should be validated by science, I decided that I would give Thagard the benefit of the doubt and have a look at his book, The Brain And The Meaning Of Life. Unfortunately, Thagard does indeed adopt the aforementioned stand. And reading it in his own words – which turned out to be identical to those used by the reviewer – does not make Thagard's position any more palatable. He comes across just as fanatic – and just as irrational – as any religious zealot. I quote the last paragraph beginning on Page 8 of the book:

What is reality? My answer will be that we should judge reality to consist of those things and processes identified by well-established fields of science using theories backed by evidence drawn from systematic observations and experiments. This view is highly contentious, as it rules out both religious faith and a priori arguments as sources of knowledge about reality. Chapter 2 will provide an argument why philosophy, like medicine and science, should be evidence based rather than faith based. Tying reality to the results of scientific investigations does not in itself rule out spiritual entities such as gods, souls, and angels, for there could be observations and experimental results that are best explained by theories postulating the existence of such entities. Historically, however, the development of naturalistic explanations in terms of physics, biology, and other sciences has rendered supernatural explanations dispensable. I will describe how theories in physics and biology have demolished theological arguments for hypotheses about divine creation to explain the origin and nature of the universe. Chapter 3 will similarly argue that neuropsychological theories are now sufficiently powerful to make it plausible that minds are brains, so that hypotheses about the existence of the soul are as superfluous as ones about gods and angels. Reality is what science can discover.

'Looking Ahead' in Chapter 1: "We All Need Wisdom"

This was not the only disappointing paragraph that I read in the early pages of Thagard's book. Earlier in the same Chapter 1, Thagard presents a two-page section entitled "Sources of Wisdom". In that section, Thagard talks about various things. He describes wisdom (as he sees it), and he draws a distinction between wisdom and knowledge (although he falls short of actually defining wisdom). He also encourages the pursuit of wisdom (despite his vagueness regarding the concept). In this section, Thagard even declares what he considers to be "the meaning of life" - "love, work, and play" (a trinity that he had already used eight times earlier, mostly as 'examples') - and he also gives the reason for that assessment (that is, "because they help to satisfy vital human needs"). (With that basis for ascertaining the meaning of life, it is a wonder that Thagard did not include "food" as a fourth element in his "meaning of life".) Thagard ends that section of Chapter 1 by declaring "[his] own approach to wisdom" ("experimental psychology and recent research in neuroscience to develop a systematic account of what matters to people and why it matters"). But, oddly enough, although the section is entitled "Sources of Wisdom", Thagard only meanders hither and thither, without even indirectly, much less directly, attempting to address the topic that he had specified in the section title.

I could go on describing the flaws in Thagard's outlook and the weakness of his arguments. Some reviewers have described his book as "tightly reasoned". I found the exact opposite to be the case. I do not expect to finish reading this book, and I certainly will not be commending it to anyone. 

"Capital in the Twenty-First Century" by Thomas Piketty

I've begun reading the new book by Thomas Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century. I have not read the entire book yet. Indeed, I may never find the time to do so. However, let me share two observations based on what that I have read so far:

• This book seems to be well written and well organized. As such, I believe the central concepts should be accessible to any moderately intelligent person - anyone who occasionally reads a book and ponders over it.
• Piketty disparages the expression of mere prejudiced speculation on the subject of wealth distribution, but he seems to engage in exactly that type of speculation when it comes to politics.

The first observation does not require any amplification, but the second observation most certainly does. Nevertheless, let me point out in advance that Piketty's political naivete (if I may call it that) does not significantly diminish his contribution in the fields of economic research and economic analysis. It merely diminishes the credibility of his proposed solutions, essentially the final one-fourth to one-third of his book.

At the bottom of Page 10, we read:

Some people believe that inequality is always increasing and that the world is by definition always becoming more unjust. Others believe that inequality is naturally decreasing, or that harmony comes about automatically, and that in any case nothing should be done that might risk disturbing this happy equilibrium. Given this dialogue of the deaf, in which each camp justifies its own intellectual laziness by pointing to the laziness of the other, there is a role for research that is at least systematic and methodical if not fully scientific.

But when it comes to politics, Piketty has already declared his own intellectually lazy and effectively deaf position. Earlier on that very same page, he dogmatically asserts:

Democracy will never be supplanted by a republic of experts—and that is a very good thing.

Regrettably, Piketty makes no effort whatsoever to substantiate either of those two assertions. Nevertheless, dogma aside, Piketty presents as an honest academic. And so, interestingly (or perhaps better to say, inevitably), Piketty does appreciate the importance of economic democracy. If not earlier, this becomes apparent in the last portion of his book, "Part Four: Regulating Capital in the Twenty-First Century". (Part Four is essentially Piketty's proposed countermeasures to the inequality issues that he painstakingly exposes in the first three parts.) For example, on Page 515, we read:

It is then easy to say that workers and their representatives are insufficiently informed about the economic realities facing the firm to participate in investment decisions. Without real accounting and financial transparency and sharing of information, there can be no economic democracy. Conversely, without a real right to intervene in corporate decision-making (including seats for workers on the company’s board of directors), transparency is of little use. Information must support democratic institutions; it is not an end in itself. If democracy is someday to regain control of capitalism, it must start by recognizing that the concrete institutions in which democracy and capitalism are embodied need to be reinvented again and again.

Unfortunately, Piketty's aforementioned political prejudices severely blinker his vision of practical solutions to the very problems he diligently describes over the course of the first 420 pages of his book. For example, on Page 465, Piketty presents what he describes as the ideal solution and then quickly dismisses it as utopian. I quote:

To regulate the globalized patrimonial capitalism of the twenty-first century, rethinking the twentieth-century fiscal and social model and adapting it to today’s world will not be enough. To be sure, appropriate updating of the last century’s social-democratic and fiscal-liberal program is essential, as I tried to show in the previous two chapters, which focused on two fundamental institutions that were invented in the twentieth century and must continue to play a central role in the future: the social state and the progressive income tax. But if democracy is to regain control over the globalized financial capitalism of this century, it must also invent new tools, adapted to today’s challenges. The ideal tool would be a progressive global tax on capital, coupled with a very high level of international financial transparency....

A global tax on capital is a utopian idea. It is hard to imagine the nations of the world agreeing on any such thing anytime soon.

Indeed, even before presenting this solution Piketty had already dismissed it at least once and possibly twice or more. I quote from Page 425:

As I have already noted [perhaps a reference to Page 32, around the middle of the "Introduction"], the ideal policy for avoiding an endless inegalitarian spiral and regaining control over the dynamics of accumulation would be a progressive global tax on capital. Such a tax would also have another virtue: it would expose wealth to democratic scrutiny, which is a necessary condition for effective regulation of the banking system and international capital flows. A tax on capital would promote the general interest over private interests while preserving economic openness and the forces of competition. The same cannot be said of various forms of retreat into national or other identities, which may well be the alternative to this ideal policy. But a truly global tax on capital is no doubt a utopian ideal.

To be fair to Piketty, he does grudgingly admit that his own ideal solution might be possible (eventually). On Page 466, he writes:

To reject the global tax on capital out of hand would be all the more regrettable because it is perfectly possible to move toward this ideal solution step by step, first at the continental or regional level and then by arranging for closer cooperation among regions.

While that does indeed make sense, Piketty then offers reasons why what he described as perfectly possible is not so simple – reasons that are outside the scope of my remarks.

Democracy regaining control over capitalism seems to be a recurring theme in the book. It starts as early as Page 9:

There are nevertheless ways democracy can regain control over capitalism and ensure that the general interest takes precedence over private interests, while preserving economic openness and avoiding protectionist and nationalist reactions. The policy recommendations I propose later in the book tend in this direction.

Unfortunately, as evidenced by the type of pessimism about solutions that Piketty demonstrates, the notion of political democracy satisfactorily restraining capitalism is just a pipe dream. Had Piketty opened his mind just a bit more, he might have grasped the symbiotic relationship between political democracy and capitalism. The prospect of economic democracy in an environment of political democracy is a fantasy, far more utopian in nature than the notion of establishing a global progressive tax on capital. All that is required for a global progressive tax on capital is the establishment of a world government. But nowhere in the 605 pages of Piketty's impressive book does he contemplate such an institution. Indeed, even the few times that Piketty mentions the United Nations (not at all the equivalent of a world government but tending in that direction), it is only as a reference for data and not as an institution that could be instrumental for socioeconomic change.

If there is a lesson to be learned from all of the above, it is the importance of understanding the interplay among the various elements (or levels) of our social existence. In this respect, the five fundamental principles of Prabhat Ranjan Sarkar's Progressive Utilization Theory (PROUT) are highly educative. In PROUT, economics is located as the second tier of a five-tiered pyramid in which practice flows upward and theory flows downward.