Monday, May 5, 2014

"The Brain And The Meaning Of Life" by Paul Thagard

Recently, while discussing the meaning of life, a self-described naturalist brought up a 2012 book by another naturalist, Paul Thagard. In that book, Thagard allegedly argued that "reality is what science can discover". That argument struck me as highly absurd. It is the essence of scientism, a religion that effectively worships science by attributing divine qualities to it and by treating scientists (and inevitably pseudoscientists) as priests. What makes scientism somewhat less refined philosophically than most religions is the fact that we all know how fallible science is, but in most cases the fallibility of God is much harder if not impossible to establish. Those who worship a transcendent God may not be able to prove the existence of their God, but neither can anyone prove the non-existence of their God. But if the God who is worshiped is not transcendent - for example, if it is a deity with physical attributes allegedly living on the top of a mountain or if it is a system of knowledge with frequently shifting content - then it is rather easy to discredit such a deity.

Given the absurdity of the notion that reality could or necessarily should be validated by science, I decided that I would give Thagard the benefit of the doubt and have a look at his book, The Brain And The Meaning Of Life. Unfortunately, Thagard does indeed adopt the aforementioned stand. And reading it in his own words – which turned out to be identical to those used by the reviewer – does not make Thagard's position any more palatable. He comes across just as fanatic – and just as irrational – as any religious zealot. I quote the last paragraph beginning on Page 8 of the book:

What is reality? My answer will be that we should judge reality to consist of those things and processes identified by well-established fields of science using theories backed by evidence drawn from systematic observations and experiments. This view is highly contentious, as it rules out both religious faith and a priori arguments as sources of knowledge about reality. Chapter 2 will provide an argument why philosophy, like medicine and science, should be evidence based rather than faith based. Tying reality to the results of scientific investigations does not in itself rule out spiritual entities such as gods, souls, and angels, for there could be observations and experimental results that are best explained by theories postulating the existence of such entities. Historically, however, the development of naturalistic explanations in terms of physics, biology, and other sciences has rendered supernatural explanations dispensable. I will describe how theories in physics and biology have demolished theological arguments for hypotheses about divine creation to explain the origin and nature of the universe. Chapter 3 will similarly argue that neuropsychological theories are now sufficiently powerful to make it plausible that minds are brains, so that hypotheses about the existence of the soul are as superfluous as ones about gods and angels. Reality is what science can discover.
'Looking Ahead' in Chapter 1: "We All Need Wisdom"
This was not the only disappointing paragraph that I read in the early pages of Thagard's book. Earlier in the same Chapter 1, Thagard presents a two-page section entitled "Sources of Wisdom". In that section, Thagard talks about various things. He describes wisdom (as he sees it), and he draws a distinction between wisdom and knowledge (although he falls short of actually defining wisdom). He also encourages the pursuit of wisdom (despite his vagueness regarding the concept). In this section, Thagard even declares what he considers to be "the meaning of life" - "love, work, and play" (a trinity that he had already used eight times earlier, mostly as 'examples') - and he also gives the reason for that assessment (that is, "because they help to satisfy vital human needs"). (With that basis for ascertaining the meaning of life, it is a wonder that Thagard did not include "food" as a fourth element in his "meaning of life".) Thagard ends that section of Chapter 1 by declaring "[his] own approach to wisdom" ("experimental psychology and recent research in neuroscience to develop a systematic account of what matters to people and why it matters"). But, oddly enough, although the section is entitled "Sources of Wisdom", Thagard only meanders hither and thither, without even indirectly, much less directly, attempting to address the topic that he had specified in the section title.

I could go on describing the flaws in Thagard's outlook and the weakness of his arguments. Some reviewers have described his book as "tightly reasoned". I found the exact opposite to be the case. I do not expect to finish reading this book, and I certainly will not be commending it to anyone. 

Wednesday, April 30, 2014

"Capital in the Twenty-First Century" by Thomas Piketty

I've begun reading the new book by Thomas Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century. I have not read the entire book yet. Indeed, I may never find the time to do so. However, let me share two observations based on what that I have read so far:
  • This book seems to be well written and well organized. As such, I believe the central concepts should be accessible to any moderately intelligent person - anyone who occasionally reads a book and ponders over it.
  • Piketty disparages the expression of mere prejudiced speculation on the subject of wealth distribution, but he seems to engage in exactly that type of speculation when it comes to politics.
The first observation does not require any amplification, but the second observation most certainly does. Nevertheless, let me point out in advance that Piketty's political naivete (if I may call it that) does not significantly diminish his contribution in the fields of economic research and economic analysis. It merely diminishes the credibility of his proposed solutions, essentially the final one-fourth to one-third of his book.
At the bottom of Page 10, we read:
Some people believe that inequality is always increasing and that the world is by definition always becoming more unjust. Others believe that inequality is naturally decreasing, or that harmony comes about automatically, and that in any case nothing should be done that might risk disturbing this happy equilibrium. Given this dialogue of the deaf, in which each camp justifies its own intellectual laziness by pointing to the laziness of the other, there is a role for research that is at least systematic and methodical if not fully scientific.
But when it comes to politics, Piketty has already declared his own intellectually lazy and effectively deaf position. Earlier on that very same page, he dogmatically asserts:
Democracy will never be supplanted by a republic of experts—and that is a very good thing.
Regrettably, Piketty makes no effort whatsoever to substantiate either of those two assertions. Nevertheless, dogma aside, Piketty presents as an honest academic. And so, interestingly (or perhaps better to say, inevitably), Piketty does appreciate the importance of economic democracy. If not earlier, this becomes apparent in the last portion of his book, "Part Four: Regulating Capital in the Twenty-First Century". (Part Four is essentially Piketty's proposed countermeasures to the inequality issues that he painstakingly exposes in the first three parts.) For example, on Page 515, we read:
It is then easy to say that workers and their representatives are insufficiently informed about the economic realities facing the firm to participate in investment decisions. Without real accounting and financial transparency and sharing of information, there can be no economic democracy. Conversely, without a real right to intervene in corporate decision-making (including seats for workers on the company’s board of directors), transparency is of little use. Information must support democratic institutions; it is not an end in itself. If democracy is someday to regain control of capitalism, it must start by recognizing that the concrete institutions in which democracy and capitalism are embodied need to be reinvented again and again.
Unfortunately, Piketty's aforementioned political prejudices severely blinker his vision of practical solutions to the very problems he diligently describes over the course of the first 420 pages of his book. For example, on Page 465, Piketty presents what he describes as the ideal solution and then quickly dismisses it as utopian. I quote:
To regulate the globalized patrimonial capitalism of the twenty-first century, rethinking the twentieth-century fiscal and social model and adapting it to today’s world will not be enough. To be sure, appropriate updating of the last century’s social-democratic and fiscal-liberal program is essential, as I tried to show in the previous two chapters, which focused on two fundamental institutions that were invented in the twentieth century and must continue to play a central role in the future: the social state and the progressive income tax. But if democracy is to regain control over the globalized financial capitalism of this century, it must also invent new tools, adapted to today’s challenges. The ideal tool would be a progressive global tax on capital, coupled with a very high level of international financial transparency....
A global tax on capital is a utopian idea. It is hard to imagine the nations of the world agreeing on any such thing anytime soon.
Indeed, even before presenting this solution Piketty had already dismissed it at least once and possibly twice or more. I quote from Page 425:
As I have already noted [perhaps a reference to Page 32, around the middle of the "Introduction"], the ideal policy for avoiding an endless inegalitarian spiral and regaining control over the dynamics of accumulation would be a progressive global tax on capital. Such a tax would also have another virtue: it would expose wealth to democratic scrutiny, which is a necessary condition for effective regulation of the banking system and international capital flows. A tax on capital would promote the general interest over private interests while preserving economic openness and the forces of competition. The same cannot be said of various forms of retreat into national or other identities, which may well be the alternative to this ideal policy. But a truly global tax on capital is no doubt a utopian ideal.
To be fair to Piketty, he does grudgingly admit that his own ideal solution might be possible (eventually). On Page 466, he writes:
To reject the global tax on capital out of hand would be all the more regrettable because it is perfectly possible to move toward this ideal solution step by step, first at the continental or regional level and then by arranging for closer cooperation among regions.
While that does indeed make sense, Piketty then offers reasons why what he described as perfectly possible is not so simple – reasons that are outside the scope of my remarks.

Democracy regaining control over capitalism seems to be a recurring theme in the book. It starts as early as Page 9:
There are nevertheless ways democracy can regain control over capitalism and ensure that the general interest takes precedence over private interests, while preserving economic openness and avoiding protectionist and nationalist reactions. The policy recommendations I propose later in the book tend in this direction.
Unfortunately, as evidenced by the type of pessimism about solutions that Piketty demonstrates, the notion of political democracy satisfactorily restraining capitalism is just a pipe dream. Had Piketty opened his mind just a bit more, he might have grasped the symbiotic relationship between political democracy and capitalism. The prospect of economic democracy in an environment of political democracy is a fantasy, far more utopian in nature than the notion of establishing a global progressive tax on capital. All that is required for a global progressive tax on capital is the establishment of a world government. But nowhere in the 605 pages of Piketty's impressive book does he contemplate such an institution. Indeed, even the few times that Piketty mentions the United Nations (not at all the equivalent of a world government but tending in that direction), it is only as a reference for data and not as an institution that could be instrumental for socioeconomic change.

If there is a lesson to be learned from all of the above, it is the importance of understanding the interplay among the various elements (or levels) of our social existence. In this respect, the five fundamental principles of Prabhat Ranjan Sarkar's Progressive Utilization Theory (PROUT) are highly educative. In PROUT, economics is located as the second tier of a five-tiered pyramid in which practice flows upward and theory flows downward. 

Monday, March 31, 2014

Sample from an article on Sarkarverse

Lord, I found You in my contemplations and my thoughts.
In the clear blue sky, in the champaka fragrance,
In a lonely heart, full of love and devotion,
Lord, I found You.
In the show of affection, in light's reflection,
In the vibrant resonance of nurturing earth,
Lord, I found You.
The lofty mountain prostrates before You;
With bowed head, his snow melts.
Lord, I found You.
Translation of a song by Shrii Sarkar 

Sarkarverse: The wikipedia of all things Prabhat Ranjan Sarkar

Sarkarverse is now easily the very best resource on the Web to get information about anything and everything connected with Shrii Prabhat Ranjan Sarkar, a.k.a. Shrii Shrii Anandamurti. Everyone is welcome to participate in creating or editing articles there.

Sunday, November 18, 2012

Neohumanism Article on Wikipedia

There is now an article on neohumanism on Wikipedia.

Another Neohumanism Presentation on the Web

Here is a new presentation of neohumanism. It covers a lot more aspects of neohumanism than the introductory presentation. To make that possible and still keep the new presentation within reasonable time boundaries, there is no narration but rather a musical background.

Friday, December 16, 2011

The Conscience of Capitalism

The conscience of capitalism? It was never very much. But what little there was seems to have begun and ended with Adam Smith.

As I have mentioned repeatedly, at its most basic, economics is an inalienable concomitance of production and distribution. It does not require rocket science or a PhD in ethics to grasp that the purpose of economics should be to fulfill the consumption-related needs and desires (physical and mental) of a population, individually and collectively. In other words, the wealth and resources of our world should be developed for the welfare and happiness of all. Both production and distribution must serve that end.

Adam Smith recognized the important role that distribution plays in any economy, but he failed to develop a scientific approach toward it. To conceal that lacuna - and perhaps to cozy up to the rich -  he declared that the  requirements of distribution are largely met automatically. (As discussed elsewhere, Smith's notion of distribution was that it is adequately - or almost adequately - managed by "an invisible hand", the work of Providence far more than any market force. This was expressed by Smith in both The Theory of Moral
Sentiments
(1759) and An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1776).) Today, 250 years later, it is patently clear that either Adam Smith's "invisible hand" does not exist or it is not wielded for distributive justice to the extent that Adam Smith maintained.

Although Adam Smith mentioned "an invisible hand" only once in The Wealth of Nations (TWON), it is arguably the most well-known assertion that he made. Perhaps that is because an invisible hand is almost all that Smith offered on the subject of distribution. On the very few occasions when Smith talked about "distribution", he mostly referred to a "natural distribution" and never a "just distribution" or an "equitable distribution".

Though Smith repeatedly condemned the rapacious greed of the wealthy, he became almost apologetic whenever he discussed any methodology that might tend to reduce the huge gap in income and lifestyle between the rich and the poor. For example, while discussing a tax on the rent of houses, Smith said: "It is not very unreasonable that the rich should contribute to the public expense, not only in proportion to their revenue, but something more than in that proportion." (V.2.71, TWON).

With such a beginning, is it any wonder that modern capitalist economists still tend to focus far more on production than distribution (assuming that they even consider distribution at all)? Talk about economic justice, and some wealthy capitalist economists merely laugh it off as idle speculation. Mention a principle like
production for consumption, and they will dismiss it as ill-conceived. What they won't tell you is that Adam Smith himself firmly endorsed that principle. Smith said: "Consumption is the sole end and purpose of all production; and the interest of the producer ought to be attended to only so far as it may be necessary for
promoting that of the consumer. The maxim is so perfectly self-evident that it would be absurd to attempt to prove it." (IV.8.49, TWON)

As a consequence of the mind-numbing influence of capitalist economics, only one out of two essential elements of economics has been developed. And even that one element has only been developed partially and, indeed, highly inadequately. A one-eyed focus on production, almost entirely ignoring its inalienable partner (distribution), is the consequence of capitalist dogma. Because of capitalist dogma, when Warren Buffett suggested taxing the rich, it was hailed as a new and noble idea. And when Bill Gates finally launched a charitable foundation and then chose to run it as a private business, he was hailed as a great philanthropist.

Adam Smith's notions of free trade conflicted with prevailing notions of mercantilism. But at the end of the day, free trade has proven to be no less elitist than mercantilism. Ultimately, both free trade and mercantilism fall under the dimension of economics that PROUT labels "commercial economy". Both free trade and mercantilism have their good and bad points. But commercial economy is only one dimension out of four in respect to a healthy economy. And a healthy economy is only one concern out of five in respect to a healthy society.